Potentially transactional ties, Albanese’s trip agenda, and visit deliverables
Fortnight of 16 to 29 October 2023
How transactional was recent relationship repair?
Australia’s Minister for Trade and Tourism Don Farrell speaking to a journalist on 23 October about the timing of Australian and Chinese announcements on wine and wind tower anti-dumping measures:
“We have an anti‑dumping body, and that body deals with those issues quite independent of government. So, whatever might be happening, for instance, on wind turbines, would be something that would be occurring quite independent of our government decisions. We’re not transactional.”
Quick take:
The last couple of weeks have seen a thick and fast flow of bilateral developments. During a Friday afternoon news dump on 20 October, the long-delayed review of Chinese company Landbridge Group’s 99-year lease of Darwin Port was released. Seemingly consistent with the last review in 2021, this latest re-examination found that “it was not necessary to vary or cancel the lease.” As previously flagged in BCB (e.g., here and here), Canberra chose not to tear up the lease. The Australian government thereby steered a vastly different course from Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s previous 2015 assessment (from opposition) that the lease was indicative of “a grave error of judgement.”
Also consistent with past BCB predictions (e.g., here, here, here, and here), it was then announced on 22 October that Canberra and Beijing had agreed to a process for the expected eventual removal of wine duties. This latest pathway would be similar to the process that saw barley duties lifted in August. This wine announcement was made days after the release of preliminary findings by Australia’s Anti-Dumping Commission recommending that anti-dumping measures on Chinese wind towers expire on 16 April 2024. Meanwhile, Chinese government representatives in both China (e.g., here and here) and Australia continued with their generally upbeat tone about bilateral ties. Beijing also welcomed (e.g., here and here) the return of Chinese artefacts that had been illegally exported to Australia.
The rapid-fire and potentially reciprocal nature of these recent moves will likely lead some to wonder whether Canberra and Beijing are coordinating concessions to secure ongoing relationship repair. Without it being in any way definitive, the close timing of these developments certainly makes it at least plausible that some of these shifts are quid pro quo efforts by both Australia and China to keep bilateral ties on an upward trajectory. To be sure, strong disavowals of such a transactional approach have come from both the Prime Minister and his Trade Minister, while Canberra has also insisted that Australian institutions like the Anti-Dumping Commission are independent and aren’t shifting decisions to ensure the further stabilisation of the Australia-China relationship.
And yet it’s striking that, for example, Australia’s anti-dumping measures on Chinese wind towers are slated to expire (16 April 2024) just weeks after China is scheduled to (all going well with the review) remove its wine duties (late March 2024). This could, of course, be nothing more than convenient timing. Still, these kinds of apparent coincidences combined with the Chinese government explicitly linking the two anti-dumping cases will prompt persistent questions about whether the Albanese government has shaped the timing of announcements, if not the decisions themselves, to butter Beijing up. (Of course, these cases might not be transactionally linked, and Beijing might be seeking to connect them as a face-saving measure aimed at showing that China is getting something in return for its likely eventual removal of wine duties. That possibility, real though it might be, will probably not dispel lingering suspicions of a quid pro quo Albanese government approach relations with China.)
Having floated the above possibilities, I’m reluctant to make any firm assessments either way. The case for caution is especially strong given the paucity of publicly available detail on what drove specific decisions on, for example, the classified Darwin Port lease review. Indeed, considering the sensitivities of both Canberra’s and Beijing’s bilateral negotiating strategies, we may never know (at least publicly) whether any quid pro quo deals were struck. Moreover, none of the above is intended to be negative judgement on the Albanese government’s approach to Australia-China relations. The analytical question of whether a quid pro quo dynamic is at play is qualitatively distinct from the normative question of whether such a transactional approach is good. Having hedged my bets with those caveats, I’ll save more granular (and speculative) analysis for a BCB special edition next week. For now, suffice it to note that as predicted in BCB many months ago, this flurry of bilateral movement will be capped off by the long-awaited 4-7 November visit to Beijing and Shanghai by Prime Minister Albanese and his retinue.
Albanese’s trip agenda
China’s Ambassador Xiao Qian speaking in Canberra on 18 October about Prime Minister Albanese’s forthcoming visit to China:
“This visit would be important for the two countries as our bilateral relations embark on the journey of another 50 years, and we expect this visit to lay down a solid foundation for a friendly and cooperative relationship between our two countries not only in the coming years, but coming decades.”
Quick take:
The time between drinks is reason enough for some pomp and circumstance during the leader-level visit later this week. When Prime Minister Albanese touches down in China, it’ll have been more than seven years since the last trip by a serving Australian leader. Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull’s trip to Hangzhou for the G20 in September 2016 was the last such visit. Combined with the ongoing and rapid repair of bilateral ties in recent months and the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Gough Whitlam’s first-ever trip by a serving Australian prime minister to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), both governments will struggle to resist the temptation to give the visit an at least partially celebratory mood.
Beijing has form for embracing diplomatic anniversaries with gusto. Even though the relationship repair was still relatively tentative when Minister for Foreign Affairs Penny Wong visited Beijing in December 2022, the Chinese government still lathered on the significance of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the Australia-PRC diplomatic relationship. At a time when China’s ties with the United States and many US allies and partners are testy, the symbolism of one of the United States’ closest friends feting a leader-level meeting with President Xi Jinping in Beijing will likely appeal to the Chinese Communist Party.
As I’ve argued before, Prime Minister Albanese himself and his Labor government will also want to make political mileage out of the visit. The stabilisation of Australia-China ties has been one of the signature first-term foreign policy objectives of the Albanese government and high-level access in Beijing is one of the key metrics of a stabilised relationship. It’d therefore be unsurprising if Prime Minister Albanese wanted to play up the significance of this visit as a way of brandishing his government’s foreign policy credentials. Meanwhile, the symmetry of a Labor prime minister visiting the PRC 50 years after a legend of the progressive left made the first trip by a serving Australian leader is likely to be alluring for Albanese.
Visit deliverables
Australia’s Minister for Trade and Tourism Farrell speaking to a journalist on 26 October about Australian lobster and beef exports to China:
“They have not yet been given permits to go back in. But again, that’s just a process issue, and I think with a bit more push on our part, we’ll get both the lobster and the meat back into China.”
Quick take:
Significant though the anniversary pageantry and leader-level discussions might be, there’ll be much more to the visit. Minister for Trade and Tourism Farrell is expected in Shanghai for a meeting with his Chinese counterpart. Meanwhile, the China International Import Expo (CIIE) on 5-10 November is likely to attract a strong Australian contingent, including Prime Minister Albanese himself, other senior Australian representatives, and something in the order of close to 200 Australian exhibitors. As floated here months ago, Prime Minister Albanese looks likely to do a CIIE walk through and perhaps even deliver a speech, as world leaders are often invited to do. And, as I’ve mused before, it seems there’s a chance of a toast or two at CIIE with Australian wine and some snacking on Australian lobster and beef.
Beyond the hobnobbing, there’ll presumably be at least some coordinated shared messaging or perhaps some joint public statements. There’ll also likely be formal expressions by both Canberra and Beijing of the significance of the 50th anniversary of former Prime Minister Whitlam’s first-ever leader-level trip to the PRC. Although it’ll likely cover well-trodden ground, some of this shared messaging can be expected to sketch, among other things, the contours of near-term bilateral cooperation. With Minister for Trade and Tourism Farrell expected to meet Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao, there’s also the possibility of an announcement of the removal of trade restrictions on lobster and/or beef during the visit. There might be some announcements on future reciprocal visits as well, including previously discussed trips to Australia by Minister of Commerce Wang and/or Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi. Perhaps there’ll even be an announcement of a leader-level visit to Australia in 2024 by Premier Li Qiang or, less likely, President Xi. Other visit deliverables might include news of the formal resumption of the Australia-China Annual Leaders’ Meeting or the Human Rights Dialogue.
To be sure, all the potential visit deliverables and the broader talk of “win-win” outcomes for Australia and China don’t mean relationship repair is done and dusted. For the moment, there are still restrictions on Australian lobster and beef going into China, and the prohibitive wine duties haven’t yet been removed, despite upbeat coverage of the recent announcement of a plan for their potential removal. As Minister Farrell himself has emphasised, the removal of the wine duties is expected to take another five months. Meanwhile, a gravely ill Australian, Yang Hengjun, still languishes in detention in China, and Canberra and Beijing remain divided over a wide range of specific bilateral irritants, human rights concerns, and international security tensions.
Nevertheless, it looks as if the forthcoming leader-level visit and associated bilateral engagements will further confirm that the Australia-China relationship is heading towards a normalisation of sorts in the diplomatic and trade arenas. Rather than a reversion to anything like the look and feel of the relationship in the early 2010s, we’re headed towards a normalisation in the modest sense of a return to a more regular rhythm of diplomatic contact and the eventual removal of the remaining trade restrictions. This means that we’ll likely be talking and trading again more or less as previously, albeit with deeper and wider rifts on all manner of pointy issues lurking just beneath the surface.
As always, thank you for reading, and please excuse any errors (typographical or otherwise). Any and all objections, criticisms, and corrections are very much appreciated.
Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull’s trip to Hangzhou for the G20 in September 2016 was the last such visit.
After his return to Australia, PM Turnbull led the West's campaign to kill Huawei. He and several ministers traveled the world warning heads of state to ban the telecom on the grounds that it represented a threat to their security.
He was lying, as usual, and Australians still whine about 'coercion' as they praise Israeli genocides.
Albanese is a petty vassal, utterly unqualified to to anything but follow US orders.