The perils of politicising bilateral ties, a prime ministerial visit to Beijing, and China's paradiplomacy
Fortnight of 15 to 28 May 2023
Partisan politicking on Australia-China relations
Minister for Trade and Tourism Don Farrell responding on 16 May to a journalist’s question about Opposition criticism of the Albanese government’s recent achievements with China:
“Well, it’s pretty cheeky, isn’t it, really? I mean, this is the mob, that their poor language resulted in all of these trade impediments, and now they’re suddenly saying they want them resolved.”
Quick take:
The Albanese government has only sporadically sought to make political mileage out of the contrast between the state of the Australia-China relationship now and prior to the May 2022 federal election. Yet this comment from Minister Farrell, which seems to blame the previous Australian government for China’s trade restrictions, is another example of intermittent moves to make partisan points about Australia-China ties. In December 2022 and January 2023, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese not only criticised the Morrison government for its handling of bilateral ties, but also credited himself with relationship repair. In a speech on 28 December 2022, the Prime Minister went so far as to claim: “we’ve gone from a government that chose to not have a single conversation with China – our major trading partner – for the entire last term they were in power, to one that understands that dialogue is always a good thing.” Meanwhile, in a speech on 22 May this year, Minister for Defence Richard Marles attacked the motives and diplomatic conduct of the previous government: “From the highest office in the land we saw the most gratuitous and inflammatory comments aimed at obtaining the best run in the newspapers without any regard to what mattered for the Australian people.” This speech was followed by an interview the next day in which Minister Marles suggested that the Albanese government’s “sober, adult way” of managing the Australia-China relationship “is a very different position to what we had” under the Morrison government.
Potential political gains make it tempting for the Albanese government to invidiously compare their track record on China with the last few years of the Morrison government. Yet there are national interest reasons for Prime Minister Albanese and his ministers to not use the Australia-China relationship to score political points. To be clear, in making the following argument, I don’t presume to offer an answer to the broader question of whether the management of Australia’s international relationships in general should be the subject of partisan debate. There isn’t space here to fully explore that much larger issue. It’s also worthwhile emphasising that my argument here shouldn’t be taken to imply a moral equivalence between how the Albanese and Morrison governments have at times sought to politicise Australia-China ties. I’ll leave it to others to unpack and adjudicate that normative point.
Those caveats aside, the first problem with moves by the Prime Minister and his ministers to blame their predecessors for the downturn in Australia-China relations is that they end up (perhaps inadvertently) whitewashing or at least minimising Beijing’s role. In other words, by attributing responsibility for relationship collapse to the Morrison government, these kinds of comments gloss over China’s actions and downplay the freedom that Beijing had to not direct coercive economic and diplomatic attacks against Canberra. Given that other countries, including China, have agency to chose how they engage with the outside world, both Labor and the Coalition should be careful about holding the other side of politics responsible for how foreign states treat Australia. Regardless of the criticisms that could be made of the pervious government’s China messaging (and as my foreign policy sparring partners will know, I’ve previously made some of those criticisms myself), attributing responsibility for past tensions in Australia-China relations solely to what Prime Minister Scott Morrison and his ministers said downplays the Chinese government’s agency. Yes, China disapproved of aspects of the Morrison government’s diplomacy and it might have been foreseeable that Beijing would take offence at some of Canberra’s language. But there’s equally no doubt that China itself chose to impose trade restrictions and freeze high-level diplomatic engagements. So, the Prime Minister’s assertion that the Morrison government “chose to not have a single conversation with China … for the entire last term” is damagingly deceptive not just because it ignores inconvenient historical facts, but also because it erroneously implies that Beijing had little/no role to play in the matter.
Beyond the issue of Beijing’s agency, there’s also the risk of misdiagnosing and simplifying the cause of the recent repair of bilateral ties. Certainly, the Albanese government has been more cautious with its China messaging. But this disciplined use of language is almost certainly not a complete account of why the Australia-China relationship has stabilised and improved in the last twelve months. For a start, and as I’ve argued previously, Albanese government messaging has neither been as cautious nor as disciplined as one might imagine. But more importantly, any plausible story of the repair of the Australia-China relationship needs to be able to account for why Beijing started sending out more positive diplomatic signals to Canberra as early as December 2021 when the Morrison government was still using harsher rhetoric. Similarly, any such plausible story must also be able to explain why the Chinese government was still issuing long lists of expectations of Australia in September 2022 months after the Albanese government had established a pattern of more cautious China messaging. None of this is to say that Canberra’s softer China language didn’t matter at all, much less that I have a complete and accurate account of why Beijing changed its approach to Australia over the course of 2021-23. But at the very least, the idea that Canberra talking more respectfully should be credited with convincing China to relent with its diplomatic and trade freeze is unlikely to be a complete picture.
Finally, and perhaps most consequentially, politicising Australia-China relations as some voices in the Albanese government have done could create a false sense of security for the Australian public. Yes, the repair of the Australia-China relationship over the last year is pretty neatly correlated with the tonal shift in Albanese government diplomacy. But there’s no guarantee that continuing to talk carefully will stop China from once again punishing Australia diplomatically and economically. Just as the Albanese government’s shift in diplomatic language probably wasn’t the only reason for relationship repair, cautious rhetoric won’t necessarily be enough to weather future storms in bilateral ties. To be clear, I fully acknowledge that Albanese government ministers and Australian officials already appreciate this point. But viewed from the perspective of managing broader public expectations, there are domestic political risks in confidently trumpeting the way in which moderate language has supposedly gotten the relationship back on track.
Regardless of the above, managing ties with China looms large among Australia’s foreign policy challenges. It’s therefore understandable that Albanese government figures would want to advertise bilateral relationship repair during their tenure and draw a contrast with previous years. But though the political temptation is great, I’d urge caution. Not only should the Albanese government avoid absolving (either directly or by implication) Beijing for its responsibility for past relationship collapse, but claiming that more nuanced diplomatic language rehabilitated ties risks both simplifying a messy historical record and creating potentially unrealistic public expectations. Considering Beijing’s sometimes-hard edged statecraft, Canberra would do well to prepare the Australian public for the possibility that even deft diplomacy won’t cushion Australia-China ties from future turbulence.
Trade restrictions and a prime ministerial visit to Beijing
Prime Minister Albanese speaking about a possible visit to China during a press conference on 19 May:
“I have been invited to visit the People’s Republic of China. I’ve always said that we would warmly welcome engagement. … It is important that any of the impediments to trade between China and Australia be lifted.”
Quick take:
This press conference set off debate about whether the removal of China’s trade restrictions should be a prerequisite for a prime ministerial visit to Beijing. Although Prime Minister Albanese’s language during the press conference and an interview on the same day didn’t spell out strict conditions for such a trip, some of the subsequent press reporting seemed to imply that removing trade restrictions was now necessary for a leader-level meeting in China. Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs Simon Birmingham certainly didn’t shy away from arguing and reiterating his view that Australia deserved “absolute clarity that these trade sanctions are going to be lifted and that that clarity should be there before the Prime Minister entertains a formal state visit to Beijing”. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Minister for Foreign Affairs Penny Wong took a decidedly less definitive approach, suggesting that Australia “would want to see continued progress on trade impediments” prior to such a trip.
Notwithstanding different plausible interpretations of Prime Minister Albanese’s comments and calls for clarity from the Opposition, it seems likely that we’ll see “continued progress on trade impediments,” thus paving the way for a prime ministerial visit. Beijing’s willingness to unwind more trade restrictions (e.g., the timber announcement on 18 May) combined with Canberra’s generally careful diplomatic language and tactical caution on contentious China policy choices make a progressive dismantling of Beijing’s trade restrictions probable in the coming months. As with the Albanese government’s shrewd manoeuvring on Confucius Institutes and foreign investment decisions, one can expect Canberra to finesse its approach to the outstanding tough China policy choices in 2023 to reduce the likelihood that Beijing will stop unwinding trade restrictions.
Of course, a prime ministerial visit to Beijing could become politically fraught if some significant trade restrictions remain in place when the expected October/November timeframe rolls around. There are likely to be misgivings about a China trip in some quarters if, for example, the hefty duties on Australia’s previously more than A$1 billion per annum wine exports to China remain in place. Similarly, such a visit is likely to be domestically contentious if Australians Yang Jun and Cheng Lei are still detained without the prospect of release. And interestingly, Minister for Foreign Affairs Wong on 24 May seemed to say (though the precise policy implication is unclear) that she was looking for “continued progress” on those two cases as well prior to a prime ministerial visit.
Yet despite possible criticisms from the Opposition and others at home, a trip to Beijing later this year still looks likely. Minister Wong offered a potentially revealing response to Ben Fordham’s suggestion that issues like the remaining trade restrictions might be “sorted out” in a prime ministerial meeting: “Yeah. Look, I think that’s a pretty wise position you’re taking, and I think you got to keep engaging and keep trying to engage.” So, it seems probable (though it’s far from guaranteed) that a prime ministerial visit will take place even if some trade restrictions remain in place and Yang Jun and Cheng Lei haven’t been released. Rather than these bilateral disagreements derailing a prime ministerial visit in the event that they are unresolved, the Albanese government seems prepared to argue for a China trip as a means of making more progress on any such outstanding trade restrictions and consular cases.
(NB The above is not to take a position on the normative question of whether Prime Minister Albanese should accept an invitation to visit China if some trade restrictions remain in place and Yang Jun and Cheng Lei remain in detention. For now, at least, I’ll leave it to others to debate that point. It’s also entirely possible that all the trade restrictions will have been removed and high-profile consular cases resolved before October/November, thereby making the above analysis moot. But given the likely longer timeline for unwinding the duties on wine in particular combined with the often-slow and halting progress on consular cases in China, such an optimistic scenario seems unfortunately unlikely.)
Paradiplomacy picks up
From the Chinese government’s readout of Brisbane Consul-General Ruan Zongze’s meeting with Logan Mayor Darren Power:
“We treasure our friendship with Australia, Queensland and Logan, and hope to promote people-to-people and local exchanges between us.”
Quick take:
This meeting is part of a what looks like an overarching trend towards more publicly advertised meetings with individuals, organisations, and subnational governments across Australia (e.g., here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here). Such revved up engagement is hardly surprising in the context of the ongoing stabilisation and repair of the Australia-China relationship at the national level. Moreover, these kinds of meetings could have been occurring for many months before they started getting regularly advertised on Chinese government websites. Still, this shift towards more openly telegraphing engagement with the Australian community appears to be yet another indication of the Chinese government’s enthusiasm for revitalising bilateral ties, including via a broader range of channels below the national level.
China also seems to be pursuing additional party-to-party diplomacy with Australia. After the May 2022 federal election, the Chinese government freely expressed its preference for the new Labor government and frustration with their Coalition predecessor. By contrast, Beijing now appears to be taking a more agnostic approach to Australia’s major party divide. On top of Ambassador Xiao Qian’s meeting with Opposition Leader Peter Dutton in November 2022, recent weeks have seen other engagements with more junior Coalition political figures at the federal and state level. These include Ambassador Xiao’s meeting on 23 May with federal Coalition MP Ian Goodenough and Perth Consul-General Long Dingbin’s 12 May meeting with Elizabeth Mettam, Leader of the Western Australian Liberal Party. The readouts of these meetings convey a conspicuously upbeat tone, especially when compared to China’s seemingly dim view of the Coalition and many of its key figures in the 2020-22 period.
Addendum: In recent weeks, I’ve noticed a dearth of English-language updates on the websites of China’s missions in Australia. Yet this decline in English-language content has coincided with a flood of additional Chinese-language reports detailing the active engagement agenda of China’s ambassador in Canberra and consul-generals in Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, and Perth. (The one partial exception being the Consulate-General in Brisbane, which still seems to be publishing regular English-language updates on Consul-General Ruan’s activities.) This discrepancy could simply be a result of oversight, resource constraints, or human error. But it’s also possible that it’s deliberate. Perhaps it’s a function of the keenness of Chinese missions in Australia to advertise to their government their active engagement with the wider Australian community? And if that’s the case, is it yet further evidence of the Chinese government’s prioritisation of relationship repair? Although an affirmative answer is possible in response to both questions, the available evidence is far from conclusive. Nonetheless, the combination of increased publicly advertised engagement that appears mostly in Chinese is an intriguing development.
As always, thank you for reading, and please excuse any errors (typographical or otherwise). Any and all objections, criticisms, and corrections are very much appreciated.
"by attributing responsibility for relationship collapse to the Morrison government, these kinds of comments gloss over China’s actions and downplay the freedom that Beijing had to not direct coercive economic and diplomatic attacks against Canberra"?
Seriously? How much abuse should China tolerate from us?
We had complete freedom not to insult, attack and lie about China but, chose instead to urge war, as the Lowy Institute's Natasha Kassam pointed out, "No other country in the world – not Taiwan, Japan or South Korea – is talking about the likelihood of war with China on a day-to-day basis. Only Australia”.
Canberra has a long history of violence, invasion, and exploitation of Asian neighbors including robbing the world’s poorest country, Timor Leste. The list below, though incomplete, is representative of Australia’s pettiness, nastiness and stupidity:
In contravention of ChAFTA, since 2019, Australia rejected a dozen Chinese investment projects and restricted areas like infrastructure, agriculture and animal husbandry on ambiguous, unfounded (and insulting) "national security concerns".
Australia launched 107 anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations of Chinese products, more than any (indeed, almost all) of China's other trading partners.
Australia politicized and stigmatized normal exchanges and cooperation, created barriers, and imposed restrictions like revoking visas for Chinese scholars, in parallel with America's identical, failed witch hunt.
Despite knowing that Covid-19 was endemic in Europe and the US before it reached China, Beijing requested a meeting with Australian officials prior to Scott Morrison’s press conference, to answer any questions and supply any data, but was ignored. The PM then told the media that international inspectors should be allowed access to China, “Weapons inspector-style, with the ability to kick open doors”.
Australia was the first non-littoral country to criticize China’s behavior in the South China Sea at the UN. China's claims in the SCS have not changed since 1989.
Australia outdid the US in demonizing the PRC’s Xinjiang and Hong Kong policies, while publicly alleging Chinese cyberattacks – none of which was ever proven, or even evidenced.
Australian politicians and media fell silent when the US refused to sign the UN resolution permitting a WHO investigation like China’s.
Canberra cancelled several BRI agreements with China with no prior notification.
Canberra repeatedly sent Australian vessels to US “freedom of navigation exercises" near the Chinese coast.
Australia spearheaded a crusade against China in multilateral forums, like the United Nations, where it voted against China at every opportunity.
Perhaps worst of all was Australia's leading the world charge to cripple China's first world tech brand, Huawei. It was cruel, deliberate, expensive and utterly cynical because there was an is no evidence behind it. Just malice.
Rant continues here: https://herecomeschina.substack.com/p/what-australia-did-to-china-c64